Wet KOA Framework

The Wet Kansspelen op Afstand Framework Three Years On: What Has and What Has Not Worked

The Wet Kansspelen op afstand framework opened the licensed Dutch iGaming market in October 2021. A three-year retrospective produces a methodologically informative picture of what the framework has and has not accomplished.

On this page 5 sections
  1. 1 What the framework was designed to accomplish
  2. 2 What the framework has accomplished
  3. 3 What the framework has not yet accomplished
  4. 4 The advertising-standards problem in particular
  5. 5 The methodological agenda for the next policy cycle

The Wet Kansspelen op afstand framework — the legislative architecture under which the Dutch licensed iGaming market operates — opened the market formally on 1 October 2021 with the first operator licenses taking effect. The framework had been developing through successive parliamentary processes from 2014 onward, with the substantive policy work concentrated in the 2017–2019 period and the operational specification work concentrated in the 2019–2021 period.

A three-year retrospective on the framework merits methodological reading rather than the headline-summary coverage that has predominated in the trade press. The framework has accomplished some of the policy objectives that motivated its development and has been operationally challenged in addressing others. Both elements of the picture are methodologically substantive and have implications for how the framework is likely to develop through the next policy cycle.

What the framework was designed to accomplish

The Wet Kansspelen op afstand framework was developed in response to a structural problem that the pre-framework regulatory environment had been unable to address. The pre-2021 Dutch market was characterized by unlicensed cross-border operators serving Dutch consumers from outside the formal Dutch regulatory perimeter, with the resulting consumer-protection gap acknowledged as the principal policy motivation for opening a licensed domestic regime.

The framework was designed to substitute a supervised licensed market for the unlicensed status quo. The policy theory was that licensed operators offering supervised products would attract Dutch consumers away from the unlicensed alternatives, with the resulting market migration producing a substantial reduction in the cross-border unlicensed footprint and a corresponding increase in the share of Dutch consumer activity that was occurring within the supervised regulatory perimeter.

The responsible-gaming infrastructure — Cruks self-exclusion, advertising-standards framework, operator-side harm-detection protocols — was designed to produce supervisory leverage that had been structurally unavailable in the pre-framework environment. The Kansspelautoriteit was given enforcement authority over the licensed estate and was provided with the operational infrastructure to apply that authority through technical-specification and audit mechanisms.

What the framework has accomplished

The licensed market exists and is operating at substantial scale. The licensed operators in the Dutch market produce regulated gross gaming revenue that has grown substantially through the framework period, with the growth pattern reflecting consumer migration from the unlicensed alternatives, market expansion within the licensed estate, and the maturation of operator products and customer relationships.

The responsible-gaming infrastructure is operating at the implementation level. Cruks is enrolled by a substantial population, the cross-operator verification is producing the intended exclusion enforcement, and the supervisory enforcement record establishes that operational implementation quality is being actively maintained through the available sanctions mechanism. The advertising-standards framework has been progressively tightened through successive policy reviews and is producing observable changes in the operator-side advertising practice.

The supervisory authority has built operational capacity that did not exist before the framework. The KSA has substantively expanded its staffing, its technical-supervisory infrastructure, and its enforcement methodology since the framework opening, with the resulting capacity now sustaining the level of supervisory activity that the framework requires. The institutional development is a substantive accomplishment in its own right, separate from the market-outcomes question.

What the framework has not yet accomplished

The cross-border unlicensed market has not been displaced to the extent that the framework policy theory had anticipated. The available evidence — KSA targeting investigations, independent research on payment-channel data, consumer survey data — establishes that a meaningful share of Dutch consumer iGaming activity continues to occur with unlicensed cross-border operators rather than within the licensed estate. The displacement effect has been partial rather than substantial.

The structural reasons for the partial displacement are methodologically substantive. The unlicensed operators offer product differentiation that the licensed estate does not, in part because the licensed framework imposes restrictions — advertising-standards limits, deposit-limit requirements, responsible-gaming friction — that the unlicensed alternatives are not subject to. The friction asymmetry produces a consumer-choice problem that the framework had partially anticipated but had under-quantified in the pre-framework analysis.

The responsible-gaming framework effectiveness — the question of whether the framework is actually producing harm-reduction at the population level rather than simply at the implementation level — is methodologically less established than the implementation success. The outcome data on Cruks, on advertising-standards interventions, and on operator-side protocol enforcement has not been integrated into a comprehensive framework-effectiveness evaluation, and the available evidence base is fragmentary.

The advertising-standards problem in particular

The advertising-standards framework has been the policy area in which the most active framework adjustment has occurred. The original framework permitted advertising practices that were progressively tightened through 2022, 2023, and 2024 policy revisions as the responsible-gaming research community and the consumer-protection bodies raised concerns about specific advertising practices and as the empirical record on advertising-related harm developed.

The tightening trajectory has produced a substantially more-restricted advertising environment than the framework originally envisaged, with the resulting restrictions on placement, content, and audience targeting now constituting a substantial element of the licensed-operator compliance environment. The policy tightening reflects substantive engagement with the harm-research base, but has also created friction asymmetry vis-à-vis the unlicensed cross-border market that does not face the corresponding restrictions.

The implementation effectiveness of the advertising-standards framework has been mixed. The KSA enforcement record documents persistent licensed-operator breaches of the advertising requirements, and the supervisor has had to escalate sanctions levels to produce compliance change. The pattern suggests that the operator-side incentive structure under the friction asymmetry may not produce stable advertising-standards compliance without sustained supervisory pressure.

The methodological agenda for the next policy cycle

The next framework policy cycle will need to engage with several methodologically substantive questions that the three-year retrospective has surfaced. The cross-border displacement question is the largest single issue — what policy approaches, beyond licensed-operator enforcement, can produce more substantial migration of Dutch consumer activity into the licensed estate.

The framework-effectiveness evaluation question is the methodologically most-difficult of the agenda items. Producing a rigorous evaluation of whether the framework is producing population-level harm-reduction outcomes requires data infrastructure and methodological approach that the framework has not yet committed to. The evaluation question is consequential for the policy direction the framework should take, but the methodological work to address it has not yet been substantively undertaken.

The advertising-standards trajectory will continue to develop. The friction asymmetry vis-à-vis the unlicensed market will need to be addressed through approaches beyond licensed-estate restrictions, and the operator-side compliance pattern suggests that supervisory engagement with the licensed estate will continue to intensify. The policy area is methodologically substantive and is likely to remain the most-active framework adjustment area through the next policy cycle.